Lessons from the Stena Europe Engine Room Fire: A Wake-Up Call for Maritime Safety

What were the initial signs of the fire and how was the alarm raised?

At 2114, a low fuel oil pressure alarm sounded in the Engine Control Room (ECR) for the port main engine fuel system, followed by an alarm triggered by the automatic start of the port standby fuel supply pump.

Subsequently, at 2115, several fire and smoke detectors in the port engine room and the funnel casing activated, sounding alarms on the bridge and in the ECR.

What was the primary cause of the fire on Stena Europe?

The fire was caused by fuel leaking under pressure from the fuel system of main engine number 3 and igniting on an exposed hot surface.

What specific component failure led to the release of fuel?

A two-screw flange connection within the fuel oil pipework loosened, allowing fuel to escape.

How did the crew initially respond to the fire alarm?

Following the alarms, the C/E(n) directed the 3/E and the motorman to investigate the fire alarms in the port engine room.

They discovered a large fire at the front inboard side of ME3 upon opening the watertight door.

The 3/E then initiated the water mist system for the port engine room, activated the engineer’s emergency call and manual fire alarm, while the C/E(n) declutched and stopped ME3 and halted the fuel pump supplying both ME1 and ME3.

The C/E(n) then alerted the bridge about the fire and its location.

What actions were taken on the bridge upon notification of the fire?

The night master, upon being informed of the fire, steered the vessel away from Fishguard harbour and instructed the 3/O to make a "working party red, close up" announcement to the crew.

How was the fuel supply to the affected engine isolated?

The C/E(d) initially attempted to manually trip the quick closing valve (QCV) for the fuel supply to ME3 but had to retreat due to the heat and smoke.
The C/E(n) then requested the bridge team to remotely activate the QCVs for all four main engines. The C/E(d) later visually confirmed the closure of the QCV for ME3 and had the bridge team reset the remote QCV lever to open the valves for the other three main engines (ME1, ME2, and ME4), after which the starboard fuel pump was started.

What firefighting measures were taken in the engine room?

The C/E(d) instructed the 3/E and motorman to gear up in firefighting suits and breathing apparatus (BA) to form an engine room fire team. Both chief engineers then prepared a water hose reel in the auxiliary engine room.

Upon opening the watertight door, they observed that the water mist system had largely extinguished the fire, leaving only small pockets of flames. The fire team subsequently extinguished a fire on the upper walkway.

What safety measure, recommended by the engine manufacturer, could have prevented the fire?

Wärtsilä, the engine manufacturer, recommended replacing the two-screw flange connection with a more secure four-screw arrangement.

How did the age of Stena Europe contribute to the incident?

The age of the vessel (over 40 years old) made maintaining compliance with SOLAS regulations challenging. The insulation and shielding on the engines had degraded over time, likely due to repeated removal and refitting during maintenance.

Explain the role of DNV in relation to the 5-yearly fuel system survey.

DNV rules required a 5-yearly survey of the main engines' fuel pressure pipes, which could be credited based on the documented maintenance history presented by the chief engineer. However, the rules were unclear about who could credit this survey.

What specific SOLAS regulation addresses the risk of flammable liquids contacting heated surfaces?

SOLAS Chapter II-2, Regulation 4 requires precautions to prevent flammable liquids from contacting heated surfaces and mandates insulation for surfaces above 220°C that could be impinged by a flammable oil system failure.

What deficiency in Stena's SMS contributed to the incident?

Stena's SMS did not adequately address the recurring issue of fuel leaks and did not ensure compliance with the defect reporting requirements outlined in document SMM-0255.